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ABSTRACT
People sometimes worry about the Singularity (Vinge
1993, Kurzweil 2005), or about the world being taken
over by artificially intelligent robots. I believe the risks
of these are very small. However, few people recognize
that we already share our world with artificial creatures
that participate as intelligent agents in our society: cor-
porations. Our planet is inhabited by two distinct kinds
of intelligent beings — individual humans and corporate
entities — whose natures and interests are intimately
linked. To co-exist well, we need to find ways to define
the rights and responsibilities of both individual humans
and corporate entities, and to find ways to ensure that
corporate entities behave as responsible members of so-
ciety.
CORPORATIONS ARE INTELLIGENT AGENTS
A corporation is an artificial legal entity, created by the
state through a particular kind of legal agreement. A
corporation can own property, can sign contracts, can
sue and be sued in court, and can be prosecuted and
punished for crimes. It can act as an economic agent on
its own behalf in our society.
A corporation can have goals, can make plans to achieve
those goals, and can use its resources to act to carry
out those plans. It solves problems and makes decisions
about how best to achieve its goals, so it can be consid-
ered as an intelligent agent, as defined by a leading text
in Artificial Intelligence (Russell & Norvig 2010, p. 34).
An agent is anything that can be viewed as perceiving
its environment through sensors and acting upon
that environment through actuators. . . . A human
agent has eyes, ears, and other organs for sensors and
hands, legs, vocal tract, and so on for actuators. A
robotic agent might have cameras and infrared range
finders for sensors and various motors for actuators. A
software agent receives keystrokes, file contents, and
network packets as sensory inputs and acts on the en-
vironment by displaying on the screen, writing files,
and sending network packets. . . .
We will see that the concept of rationality can be
applied to a wide variety of agents operating in any
imaginable environment. Our plan in this book is to
use this concept to develop a small set of design prin-
ciples for building successful agents — systems that
can reasonably be called intelligent.
Knowledge and Inference
In addition to having sensors and effectors, an intelligent
agent must represent knowledge and perform inference
in order to make rational decisions about its actions.
For a corporate entity, much of its knowledge is rep-
resented in external memory — databases, documents,
reports, and memos. However, the majority of its knowl-
edge is represented in the minds and in the skills of its
constituent human members. This includes knowledge
of the “corporate culture” — the way things are done in
and by this particular corporation. The corporate cul-
ture specifies how an individual must behave to function
successfully as part of this particular corporate entity.
Inference within a corporate entity takes place, in part,
through specified business processes. Other kinds of in-
ference take place, starting with an individual human
decision, which is then evaluated by an appropriate set
of members in the corporate entity against the goals, pri-
orities, and values of the corporation, to determine the
correctness of that conclusion or decision, before action
is taken.
The Genus of Corporate Entities
A discussion of “corporations” typically focuses on for-
profit corporations, since these have distinctive legal
properties and are influential in our society. However, we
will treat for-profit corporations as one species within the
larger genus1 of corporate entities, which also includes
non-profit corporations, unions, governments large and
small, churches old and new, and other species of corpo-
rate entities.
We define a corporate entity as a legal construct, consti-
tuted out of other intelligent agents, capable of acting as
an agent on its own behalf. That is, it can own property,
can enter into contracts, can sue and be sued in court,
and can be prosecuted and punished for crimes.
1A biological taxonomist might argue that corporate entities
should be considered to be a separate kingdom, rather than
a mere genus, but we will leave this issue for future work.
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A corporate entity is made up of individual people (and
of other agents), somewhat as an individual human is
made up of cells, tissues, and organs. The existence of
a corporate entity is typically not limited to a specified
period of time, or to the lifetime of any individual or set
of human members, so it is potentially immortal.
Corporations are not invulnerable, of course, since they
can die of starvation, merge with or be devoured by oth-
ers, or be destroyed in some other way. Indeed, corporate
entities exist and evolve in a world of Darwinian selec-
tion, which naturally leads to a survival drive. (A robot,
on the other hand, is a human-designed artifact and it
may or may not have a survival drive.)
Defining the precise boundaries of the genus of corporate
entities is difficult and subtle, and we shall not attempt
to settle it here. However, for many species of corporate
entity (including for-profit corporations), the existence
of an entity is straight-forwardly tied to the existence of
a legal corporate charter.
The degree of independent agency a corporation has,
relative to particular individual human members, varies
along a wide spectrum. The agency of a tiny corporation
is effectively indistinguishable from that of its human
creators. A large corporation such as Apple, Microsoft,
or GM is a distinct agent from even its most powerful
individual human members, much as a human being is
a distinct entity from his or her lungs or heart or even
brain. This is clearly illustrated by the fact that Apple
Computer, Inc. was able (however unwisely) to fire its
founder, Steve Jobs. If they were the same agent, this
would not have been possible.
The focus of this essay is on large, persistent corporate
entities whose agency is clearly distinct from that of any
given individual human. While the boundaries may be
controversial, the existence of the core cases is not.
A corporation is not a person
“Corporations are people!”, Mitt Romney, 8-11-2011.
A corporation is made up of people, somewhat as indi-
vidual humans are made up of cells, tissues, and organs.
Few large corporations are under the control of any par-
ticular individual. Even the founder or CEO of a large
corporation keeps his position only as long as his or her
actions are seen as consistent with the goals of the cor-
poration.
The 1985 decision by Apple Computer, Inc. to fire Steve
Jobs could be seen as the outcome of a political process
among the very human senior managers at Apple. How-
ever, this same process can also be seen as the mechanism
by which a corporate entity makes a decision. An anal-
ogy is with the neuronal balance between stimulatory
and inhibitory neural activations that leads to winner-
takes-all activation of a particular down-stream neuron
(Koch & Ullman 1985).
The checks and balances among the “organs” of a corpo-
ration do a pretty good job of preventing even a powerful
individual like a founder, the CEO, or members of the
Board of Directors from substantially changing the pri-
orities of a corporation they are part of.
Corporations are intelligent agents that function as part
of our society. However, it is important to be clear:
A corporation is not a person.
Individual human beings are persons.
The term “legal person” is a source of confusion. While
it is a specialized term in law, the difference between the
legal term and the commonsense understanding of “per-
son” is so great that the use of the term is misleading.
A less misleading term for a corporation might be “legal
agent”.
The status of corporations as “legal persons” is usu-
ally attributed to a court decision (U.S. Supreme Court
1886), but that assertion appears only in the “headnote”
— commentary by the court reporter without legal sta-
tus (Hartmann 2010, Chap. 1). Nonetheless, subsequent
court decisions have built on this foundation, however
inadequate.
People and corporations are different
An individual human person has consciousness and men-
tal and emotional states, and adult humans can take
responsibility for their actions. To the extent that these
concepts are applicable at all, they have very different
meanings for corporations.
While a corporation can have goals, plans, and ac-
tions of its own, it seems unlikely that a corporation
can be considered conscious in any meaningful sense
(Kuipers 2008). Without the ability to feel things like
pain, or fear, or shame, or guilt, the concept of “taking
responsibility” cannot mean for a corporate agent any-
thing like what it means for an individual human being.
Therefore, a corporate entity, as such, does not have a
conscience: the ability to understand, feel, and regret
what they have done wrong.
A corporate entity, as such, also lacks an imagination:
the ability to envision some state of affairs that does not
yet exist. For example, one of Steve Jobs’ great gifts
at Apple Computer, Inc. was his ability to envision the
qualities of the products he wanted designed, and to in-
sist that product designs achieve his vision. While there
is AI research on innovative design, the capabilities of
individual humans are far beyond what can be achieved
by artificial computational systems or collectively intel-
ligence corporate entities. (“Design by committee” is
justly reviled.)
A human person is an individual, and is not the same
person as any other individual. (We will ignore ex-
tremely rare pathologies such as split-brain cases, con-
joined twins, and multiple-personality disorders.) Cre-
ation of a new person is an arduous (though not un-
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pleasant) biological, educational, and social process. The
number and identity of individual human persons is
therefore a reasonably stable property, allowing rights
and responsibilities to be assigned in a reasonably stable
way.
New corporations, however, can be created with relative
ease, and they can split, merge, and partially or entirely
own each other in ways that have no analog for individual
humans. “Dummy” corporations can easily be created
to shield the identity and responsibility of individual or
corporate actors. This difference in properties is very im-
portant when considering the rights and responsibilities
of the different types of agents in society.
Non-humans own and control our world
A large portion of the wealth and productive capacity
of the world is controlled by corporations (Hartmann
2010). The effect of laws passed over the past 150 years
or so have given corporations commanding advantages
over individual human beings in the economic sphere.
The fundamental goal of a for-profit corporation is
typically defined as increasing shareholder value2, and
progress toward this goal is interpreted and overseen by
its Board of Directors. (We will discuss this point in
more detail below.) Unlike individual human beings, a
corporation does not have a bounded lifespan. This is
important in the economic sphere, where the power of
compound interest really takes off after several decades
of economic life.
Darwinian evolution ensures that surviving corporations
are focused on accumulating and protecting wealth,
which is life’s blood to a corporation. Not surprisingly,
the economic sphere flows over into the political sphere.
The U. S. Constitution gives the vote to individual hu-
mans, and not to corporations. However, corporations
have accumulated large amounts of economic and polit-
ical power, and they are driven to survive. Naturally,
they respond to threats by taking actions to influence
individual humans to vote in ways that protect their in-
terests.
In the “Citizens United” decision (U.S. Supreme Court
2010), the U. S. Supreme Court decided that corpora-
tions, as “legal persons”, are entitled to free speech, just
as the Constitution guarantees to individual human be-
ings. The explicit purpose of this is to allow corporations
to spend their enormous economic resources to influence
human voters without legal restrictions (Hartmann 2010,
Chap. 11).
2Note that “increasing shareholder value” really means in-
creasing the assets, and therefore the power, of the corporate
entity. If the shareholders were to decide to “cash out” that
value, for example by selling their shares in large numbers,
the continued existence of the corporation itself is threatened.
An important survival goal for a corporation is to convince
its shareholders to leave their share of the value in place.
Large for-profit corporations like Exxon or Halliburton
negotiate as peers with sovereign states, less powerful
than a few, but more powerful than most. In principle,
they are governed by the laws of the country in which
they are incorporated. But in practice, they keep their
headquarters in states or countries where governments
and laws are congenial, and act globally.
A dystopian view
We live in a social, economic, and political ecology
including two somewhat-interdependent species, each
driven to survive, but each having different types of ca-
pabilities. Humans do not face extinction, any more than
do the chicken or the dairy cow, but rather, subjugation.
Consider the economic and political spheres of our world
as areas of ongoing interaction and conflict between two
different intelligent species that inhabit the Earth. Not
conflict among races of human beings (who are equal
under law and morality), but between genus homo and
genus corporation, or at least the species of for-profit
corporations. Corporate entities are treated quite dif-
ferently from humans under the law, and often to the
disadvantage of humans (Hartmann 2010, Part III).
Corporations are artificial entities, created by humans
within constraints defined by human-made laws. In prin-
ciple, those laws could be changed. However, corpo-
rations are now powerful members of the society, able
to influence political decisions about changes to current
law. Do humans still have the power to change the laws,
so that humans and corporations can co-exist in society,
better than we do now?
These concerns are real and serious. Even so, I think the
dystopian future is not inevitable.
CORPORATIONS ARE MEMBERS OF OUR SOCIETY
In national political discussions, a wide range of opin-
ions are expressed about whether corporations are good,
job-creating entities to be supported and encouraged, or
whether they are evil, exploitative entities that should
be restrained or destroyed.
People have a desire to work together. People have a de-
sire to identify with and work for something larger than
themselves as individuals, whether it is family, church,
nation, state, or corporation (Maslow 1968). The cor-
porate form is one manifestation of this desire. We may
need to reconsider the specific legal constraints on that
form, but eliminating corporations is not an option.
Furthermore, corporations are extremely wealthy and
powerful. It would be difficult in practical terms to ex-
clude them from participation in our society.
We must take seriously the idea that, both now and into
the future, our society consists of two distinct kinds of
beings — individual humans and corporate entities —
whose natures and interests are intimately linked.
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As members of the same society as individual humans,
corporations have responsibilities as well as rights.
The Responsibility of a For-Profit Corporation
It is often said that for-profit corporations are legally
constrained to maximize shareholder value above all
other considerations. The claim is that boards of di-
rectors and senior executives can be successfully sued
for pursuing goals other than immediate shareholder
gain. This is often supported by quoting the 1919 Dodge
v. Ford decision:
A business corporation is organized and carried on pri-
marily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers
of the directors are to be employed for that end. The
discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice
of means to attain that end, and does not extend to a
change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits, or
to the nondistribution of profits among stockholders
in order to devote them to other purposes. (Michigan
Supreme Court 1919)
Indeed, the founders of Craigslist were recently found
delinquent in their fiduciary duty to a shareholder (eBay)
for actions taken to protect their corporate culture at the
cost of shareholder value.
Having chosen a for-profit corporate form, the craigslist
directors are bound by the fiduciary duties and stan-
dards that accompany that form. Those standards
include acting to promote the value of the corporation
for the benefit of its stockholders. (Delaware Chancery
Court 2010, pp. 60–61)
At the same time, several legal authorities (Smith 1998,
Stout 2007) argue that for-profit corporations may act
in the interests of a number of different stakeholders, in-
cluding employees, customers, creditors, the community,
and the environment, as well as shareholders. Such ac-
tions may be justified in terms of the long-term interests
of the shareholders.
Court decisions on this topic tend to arise in the context
of the defensive tactics taken by a board of directors
to avoid a hostile takeover. The question is whether a
board may adopt tactics (e.g., a “poison pill”) to repel a
take-over, or whether it is obliged to seek and accept the
highest offer. The underlying concern is that members
of a board of directors could act in their individual self-
interest, rather than in the interests of the corporation
or its shareholders.
The business judgment rule is the long-standing pre-
sumption that the actions of a board of directors are
taken in the best interests of the corporation; that is, the
burden of proof is on the contrary argument. In the Un-
ocal decision (Delaware Supreme Court 1985), the court
narrowed this defense, requiring a board to show that
the take-over constituted a threat to corporate policy or
effectiveness, and that the response was reasonable in
terms of impact on shareholders, creditors, customers,
employees, and the community (the wider set of stake-
holders is important here). The next year, in the Revlon
decision (Delaware Supreme Court 1986), the court held
that, once the sale of a company is inevitable, the role of
the other stakeholders falls away, and the board’s respon-
sibility is to get the highest price for the shareholders.
For the purposes of this essay, our main conclusion from
this discussion is that it is not illegal for an on-going for-
profit corporation to consider stakeholders other than
the shareholders, and values other than maximizing
profit, although these other considerations must be jus-
tifiable in terms of their long-term value for the share-
holders. For example, it would seem straight-forward
for a large and long-lived corporation with substantial
investments in agricultural land, or real estate in coastal
cities, to justify significant investments toward solving
the problem of climate change.
Of course, this point is not widely appreciated, and many
corporations do make their decisions strictly to maxi-
mize profit and shareholder value. This has led some
commentators to assert that corporate agents are essen-
tially psychopaths in the way they function in society
(Bakan 2003). Our conclusion is that, while this may be
true in some (and possibly many) cases, it is not neces-
sarily true, and thus can potentially be changed. It is
both possible and legal for a for-profit corporation to act
as a responsible member of society.
A member of society has responsibilities
Every person who participates in society has both rights
and responsibilities. Rights get a lot of attention, with
much less given to responsibilities.
The law enforces certain responsibilities. The obvious
cases are prohibitions: murder, theft, driving on the
wrong side of the street, etc. There are also laws against
selfish inaction in serious situations: reckless endanger-
ment, negligent homicide, etc.
However, the responsibilities of a person in society go
beyond simply obeying the law. A person has “moral
responsibilities” that are not specifically enforced by law,
but which a person should do, in order to be a member in
good standing of the society. These are often expressed
in ways like:
“Ask not what your country can do for you – ask what
you can do for your country.”
“Do unto others as you would have them do unto you.”
“Love thy neighbor as thyself.”
These involve acting in ways to support other members,
and improve the society as a whole.
The Golden Rule — “Love thy neighbor as thyself” — is
taught in the Old Testament, in the New Testament, and
in the writings of many other religions. It means that it
is not enough to obey the law, to avoid lying, stealing,
killing, and so on. We are instructed to love our neigh-
bors, which means to care about them and their well-
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being as persons, and not just treat them as instruments
or obstacles in pursuit of our own goals.
If corporations are members of our society, then the
Golden Rule means that corporations should treat indi-
vidual humans as their neighbors, as persons whose own
needs and interests matter, and not simply as instru-
ments and obstacles to be optimized over, in the pursuit
of wealth.
But if these moral responsibilities are not enforced by
law, how can they be enforced? What about the
“Mr. Scrooge” figure, who pursues his own interests with
callous disregard, even contempt, for the welfare of oth-
ers, but without breaking the law?
Social pressure is the mechanism by which society re-
minds individuals that they are failing to live up to their
moral responsibilities. Other members of society com-
municate society’s low regard for irresponsible behavior.
The individual comes to feel shame and guilt, which mo-
tivates them to change their behavior.
Lawrence Kohlberg (Kohlberg 1971) proposed a detailed
stage theory of moral development, showing how indi-
viduals progress from simply avoiding punishment and
pursuing self-interest, to responding to shame and guilt,
to the development of a principled conscience.
Many corporations are responsible and productive mem-
bers of our society, creating wealth and jobs, taking care
of their shareholders, customers, employees, the commu-
nity, and the environment. It is possible for corporations
to be good neighbors as part of our society.
But many corporations are not good neighbors. Some
corporations act as though they have no responsibility
to the society they are part of, that their only respon-
sibility is to create wealth for their shareholders. They
seem to believe that society provides them with rights,
but there are no corresponding responsibilities beyond
avoiding legal prosecution.
This amounts to the “pursuit of self-interest” level near
the bottom of Kohlberg’s hierarchy of moral develop-
ment. Such a corporation attempts to avoid punishment
for breaking the law, to the extent that punishment inter-
feres with increasing shareholder value. This can lead to
corporate lobbying to change the law, or to treating legal
penalties as simply part of the cost of doing business.
Is the “Invisible Hand” Enough?
Is it good for society to allow corporations’ responsibil-
ities to be only at the “pursuit of self-interest” stage
of moral development? The economic argument of the
“invisible hand” (Smith 1776), says that it is. The claim
is that businesses, acting in their own self-interest, want
more satisfied customers, and therefore compete to pro-
vide better value to those customers.
According to this position, it is perfectly reasonable and
acceptable for a corporation to treat individual humans
as instruments to be optimized and/or obstacles to be
removed in order to maximize its wealth. This behav-
ior would be considered reprehensible, even immoral, for
individual human beings.
In contrast, in his inaugural address, President John
Kennedy said: “Ask not what your country can do for you
– ask what you can do for your country.” This view of citi-
zenship reminds us that everyone who enjoys the benefits
of a society, including the rights it confers, also bears cor-
responding responsibilities. This principle should extend
to corporations.
Another dystopian future
I have rejected as implausible the “Terminator” scenario,
with hostile intelligent robots trying to exterminate the
human race. Nonetheless, AI and robotics are making
steady progress, automating increasing numbers of jobs
previously held by humans.
Historically, automation has created more jobs than it
has destroyed. However, those jobs are typically not
for the same people, or for people with similar levels of
training. And there is no guarantee that the creation of
more jobs will continue. It is conceivable that all jobs
could be eliminated, except for a few jobs for scientists,
engineers, and senior managers (Vonnegut 1952).
Taking this to the limit, one can imagine a corporation,
perhaps in the financial industry, with no humans at
all, workers or even shareholders! If one takes a purely
instrumental view of human work, this scenario becomes
a plausible goal for corporations to work toward.
WHAT IS RESPONSIBLE CORPORATE BEHAVIOR?
What is responsible behavior for corporate entities? Cor-
porations in the modern sense have only existed for a few
centuries (Hartmann 2010), and we haven’t had time to
explore the answers to this question in the same depth
as for individual humans. The notion that corporations
are only responsible for creating shareholder wealth is
clearly inadequate, if they are to function as members of
our society.
What is responsible behavior for individual humans? We
have been trying to answer this question for millennia.
There is no single clear answer, of course, but the Golden
Rule — “Love your neighbor as yourself” — appears in the
writings of virtually all major religions. More generally,
treat other people the way you would want to be treated
if you were in their circumstances.
Responsibility is long-term self-interest
The United States of America was created by its Found-
ing Fathers based on a radical vision of the relationship
between individual human citizens and their overall so-
ciety (Locke 1689). Social contract theory (Hobbes 1651,
Locke 1689) describes how government is justified by the
agreement of the people to give up certain rights in re-
turn for overall improvements in welfare and security.
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Today, we must reason carefully about the relationship
between these AIs — corporate entities — and the soci-
ety that we individual human beings share with them.
We need to find clear, coherent sets of rights and respon-
sibilities for both corporations and individuals. This is in
the best interests of corporations, as well as of humans.
When we all act responsibly, we can vastly increase the
prosperity and well-being of everyone in our society. But
if everyone, or even a significant minority, acts selfishly
and irresponsibly, then much of the resources of society
goes into attack and defense against each other, rather
than into the growth of prosperity and well-being for the
society as a whole. We are all poorer as a result.
This illustrates an important aspect of responsibility,
ethics, and even morality. Very often, the long-term best
outcome requires giving up short-term benefits, as in
the famous Prisoner’s Dilemma problem (Axelrod 1984,
Poundstone 1992).
Historically, better pay for factory workers incrementally
reduced profits, but created a much larger class of poten-
tial customers. There was a cost in tax dollars for invest-
ments in infrastructure such as the Interstate Highway
System, federally funded scientific research, and the In-
ternet, but these unleashed growth and innovation that
created vastly more wealth than the original investment.
As an almost whimsical example, agreeing that everyone
should drive on the right side of the street modestly re-
duces everyone’s freedom to drive where they wish, but
vastly increases the efficiency and safety of driving for
everyone.
It is sometimes said that socially responsible behav-
ior is a waste of resources that will be driven to ex-
tinction by Darwinian competition among corporations
(Friedman 1970). However, rules for corporate social re-
sponsibility3, like rules for ethical behavior by individ-
uals, may encode non-local (and non-obvious) rules for
optimal behavior in the long run. Short-sighted corpora-
tions that fail to act responsibly may well find themselves
selected against, just as states that have stuck to feudal
forms of government have been marginalized.
Irresponsibility leads to political unrest
Both the Occupy Wall Street movement and the Tea
Party movement are driven by a strong populist sense
that the distribution of rights and responsibilities are
seriously out of balance in our society.
Some people are offended that poor people might be get-
ting a “free ride” through government supports, without
taking responsibility for their own welfare. Other peo-
ple are offended that wealthy and powerful corporations
might be getting a “free ride”, getting bailed out at great
cost after their irresponsible behavior brought the entire
economic system to the brink of failure, and then acting
only in their own self-interest, rather than helping the
recovery of the society as a whole.
3http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corporate social responsibility
There is likely truth behind both movements, and the
balance between rights and responsibilities must be re-
stored in both situations. It is important, even essen-
tial, to be clear about the rights and responsibilities of
everyone in our society. We focus here on the rights
and responsibilities of corporations because they control
vastly greater wealth and power in our society than do
poor people.
Productivity versus jobs
Maximizing productivity is a key goal for corporate eco-
nomic agents, and is widely reported and applauded.
Since productivity is the ratio of the value of goods and
services produced to the value of materials and work
used to produce them, the wages paid to human workers
appears in the denominator. Therefore, productivity is
often maximized by finding ways to decrease human jobs
and human wages.
Jobs are important for individuals, in part so they can
earn money to take care of their needs and wants, and so
they can pay taxes to help support the general society.
However, it is just as important that, when a person
holds a job, he or she is taking responsibility for do-
ing that job, doing it well, and earning the money they
receive. The worker is learning how to take responsibil-
ity, and learning to appreciate the value of responsible
behavior. Without jobs, people become poor and de-
pendent, sometimes criminal, a burden to society rather
than contributors. Lack of jobs contributes to the im-
balance between rights and responsibility in individual
humans.
Providing jobs is not simply a cost of production, to be
minimized to increase productivity and profits. Provid-
ing jobs is one way a corporation contributes to society
as a whole (Schumacher 1979). Responsible corporations
recognize this. It is said that, at the beginning of the
20th century, Henry Ford paid his auto workers several
times more than the prevailing wage so they could afford
to buy his cars. Far from cutting into corporate profits,
this seemingly irrational act contributed to the creation
of the American middle class and helped make both the
United States and the Ford Motor Company wealthy and
successful.
Can responsible behavior be enforced?
For society to function, there must be ways beyond en-
forcement of legal constraints to ensure responsible be-
havior. Most people feel empathy for other people, which
encourages behavior following the Golden Rule. Indeed,
it is argued that lack of empathy may be responsible
for psychopathy and evil in people (Baron-Cohen 2011),
and others have extended the argument to corporations
(Bakan 2003).
Parents work to instill a sense of right and wrong in
their children, often by teaching the appropriate occa-
sions for feelings of shame and guilt (Kohlberg 1971).
These feelings are important aversive responses to social
PROCEEDINGS, CI 2012
pressure, and are thus important to the social control of
bad individual behavior.
Without consciousness, it is hard to imagine how a cor-
poration can have feelings like empathy, shame, or guilt.
(But see (Hall 2007).) We have discussed how a cor-
porate entity can explicitly rely on the imagination and
creativity of individual humans who are part of the cor-
poration. Perhaps there is a way to ensure that a corpo-
rate entity cultivates and uses the sense of moral respon-
sibility in its human elements, rather than subordinating
those moral responses to an overly simple corporate goal,
such as “Profit above all!”
CONCLUSIONS
Insights from many different fields will be needed to solve
this complex problem.
Artificial Intelligence contributes the insight that artifi-
cial entities can be intelligent agents, and in particular,
that corporate entities meet the criteria for being intel-
ligent agents that participate in our society.
Ecology contributes insights into the diverse ways that
different species can co-exist in a shared ecosystem, co-
operating and competing simultaneously. Evolutionary
biology contributes insights into the ways that such eco-
logical relationships evolve over time, and how they in-
fluence, and are influenced by, the resources available in
the environment. Sociology and anthropology contribute
insights into the diverse ways that societies of intelligent
human agents interact with each other, including the
meaning of culture. In our perspective here, corporate
culture is one of the ways that a corporate entity repre-
sents knowledge and maintains its identity.
Business and law contribute insights into the structure,
behavior, and function of corporate entities. Economics
contributes insights into the primary environment within
which corporate entities, particularly for-profit corpora-
tions, perceive, plan, and act. An important insight from
law is that a common observation — that for-profit cor-
porations must by their nature put profit above all other
considerations — is not as immutable as commonly be-
lieved.
The study of moral philosophy and moral evolution con-
tributes insights into how rules for responsible, ethical,
and moral behavior constrain action in ways that re-
sult in substantially better outcomes for the society as
a whole, and in many cases for every individual within
it. The study of moral development provides insights
into how these rules are learned by children and other
newcomers into a society.
It is plausible that eventually, evolutionary processes will
select for corporate entities that follow (and compel each
other to follow) rules for responsible behavior that im-
prove the state of everyone in society. However, learn-
ing through evolution is a process that is slow, painful,
and expensive in lives and resources. Evolution operates
through both competition and catastrophic environmen-
tal collapse, killing off vast numbers of individuals and
species, depending on statistical improvements in fitness
among the population of survivors.
As intelligent creatures, both in genus homo and in genus
corporation, we can hope to draw on the knowledge we
already possess, and learn better ways to act and interact
in our society. Perhaps it will be possible to improve on
the slow and unimaginably painful evolutionary process,
and find ways for humans and corporate entities to co-
exist in a positive way.
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